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Globalization and Standards: 
The Logic of Two-Level Games 
JANE K. WINN* 
Abstract:  The emergence of a global information 
architecture has fueled regulatory competition among 
nations and regions to set information and communication 
technology (“ICT”) standards.  Such regulatory competition 
can be thought of as a two level game:  level one is 
competition to set ICT standards within a nation or region; 
level two is competition to set the global ICT standards with 
reference to local standards.  The United States and the 
European Union are global leaders in setting ICT standards, 
and compete to set global ICT standards based on different 
local regulatory cultures:  the U.S. is a “liberal market 
economy” (“LME”) within which informal standard 
developing processes are perceived as legitimate, while 
formal standard developing processes are perceived as 
legitimate within the “coordinated market economies” 
(“CME”) that tend to dominate EU regulation.  In recent 
decades, informal ICT standard setting organizations 
(“SDOs”) known as consortia, which are more narrowly 
focused and less transparent than traditional SDOs have 
emerged in the U.S. and have come to dominate global ICT 
regulatory competition.  Standards for Radio Frequency 
Identifiers (“RFID”) provide an example that illustrates this 
trend.  EU regulators now are considering what changes may 
be needed in the EU system of harmonizing standards and 
EU regulation in order to reverse this trend.  If EU regulators 
succeed in engaging with selected ICT standards consortia, 
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this might permit CME regulation to prevail over LME 
regulation in competition to set global ICT standards. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Robert Putnam once observed that there had been few systematic 
attempts to take account of the interaction between national strategies 
in international arenas and domestic strategies within national 
arenas. He further proposed the metaphor of the “two-level game” as a 
framework for organizing the analysis of national and international 
political dynamics simultaneously.1  For Putnam, Level I was the 
international relations game, Level II was the domestic politics game, 
and the goal was to achieve acceptable outcomes to international 
relations challenges that were also acceptable outcomes within each of 
the domestic political systems of the relevant players.2  This essay will 
apply Putnam’s metaphor of the two-level game to the interaction 
between national strategies to achieve international agreement on 
technical standards that benefit domestic economic interests, and 
domestic strategies to balance the competing interests of producers 
and consumers with regard to the content of technical standards.3  In 
the standards arena, global recognition of technical standards is the 
Level I game, while domestic recognition of standards is the Level II 
game. 
 In order to treat the adoption of technical standards as equivalent 
to the outcome of international diplomacy or domestic political 
processes, it is necessary to recognize the development and 
implementation of standards as the outcome of political, economic, 
and technical processes.4  Different governance structures for 
 
 
 
 
1 Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:  The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 
INT’L ORG. 427, 436 (1988). 
2 Id. at 436–37. 
3 In order to distinguish industrial or engineering standards from legal standards or norms, 
the former are referred to in this paper as “technical standards.”  The International 
Organization for Standardization has defined the former as:   
A document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, 
for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their 
results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context [and]   
. . . be based on the consolidated results of science, technology and experience, and aimed 
at the promotion of optimum community benefits.  Standards and 
RegulationsDefinitions, Int’l Org. for Standardization, Mar. 25, 2008, 
http://www.standardsinfo.net/info/livelink/fetch/2000/148478/6301438/standards_reg
ulations.html. 
4 SAMUEL KRISLOV, HOW NATIONS CHOOSE PRODUCT STANDARDS AND STANDARDS CHANGE 
NATIONS 23–24 (University of Pittsburgh Press 1997). See generally ANTHONY OGUS, 
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standard-developing institutions have emerged in different countries, 
representing a wide range of approaches from markets, self-
regulation, government regulation, and direct government control.5  
The study of the political processes associated with the development 
and diffusion of technical standards should therefore recognize that 
the full range of options included in “new governance” analyses of 
political institutions may be involved.6  In technical standards arenas, 
the equivalent of a successful outcome in Putnam’s two-level game in 
international relations would be the simultaneous voluntary adoption 
of technical standards in both global and domestic markets in a 
manner recognized as legitimate in both international and national 
political processes. 
 As the impact of information and communications technologies 
(“ICT”) on national and international economic activities grows,7 the 
importance of ICT standards is also growing.  While ICT standards 
and SDOs share many features with traditional industrial economy 
product standards and SDOs, they differ significantly in certain 
respects.8  One of the most notable differences is the magnitude of the 
externalities, or network effects, created by the need for 
interoperability of different ICT systems and products, and the 
                                                                                                                   
REGULATION:  LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY (Peter Cane et al. eds., Oxford 
University Press 1994); ROGER BOUT, MARC BRUSCHI, MONIQUE LUBY & SYLVAINE POILLOT-
PERUZZETTO, LAMY DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE: CONCURRENCE, DISTRIBUTION, CONSOMMATION 
(Wolters Kluwer France 2006). 
5 Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards:  Technological Rationality 
or Primacy of Power?, 56 WORLD POL. 1, 3–4, 23, 25 (2003). 
6 Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action:  An 
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT:  A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 18 
(Lester M. Salamon ed., Oxford University Press 2002). 
7 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Private Services-Producing 
Sector Continued to Lead Growth in 2006, Jan. 29, 2008, 
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/industry/gdpindustry/2008/gdpind06_rev.htm 
(noting ICT producing-industries constitute less than 4% of the U.S. GDP, but account for 
almost 15% of GDP growth). 
8 See CARL CARGILL, OPEN SYSTEMS STANDARDIZATION:  A BUSINESS APPROACH 118–19 
(Prentice Hall 1996), (noting  that formal SDOs normally have two major components:  the 
larger component is the volunteer committees made up of representatives of the 
engineering discipline that will be served by the completed standard (usually called 
working groups or technical committees), while the smaller component is the 
administrative section that manages meetings, tracks drafts, and administer voting 
procedures).   
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problem of high switching costs, or “lock-in.”9  In response to the 
rapid pace of innovation in ICT markets and the large economic stakes 
created when strong network effects are present, new forms of 
informal private SDOs known as “consortia” or “fora” have emerged in 
recent decades.10  Although in theory, informal ICT standards bodies 
could be based in any developed market economy, as a practical 
matter, most of the hundreds of consortia now operating have roots in 
the U.S. economy.11  While ICT standards consortia in particular are 
often more nimble and effective at navigating the treacherous straits 
of global standards competition than more traditional SDOs, one 
factor that often contributes to their greater agility is their lack of 
transparency and public accountability relative to traditional SDOs.12 
 The development of standards is normally an integral element of 
modern national political, economic and legal systems; the structure 
of SDOs normally varies from country to country just as their political, 
 
 
 
 
9 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES:  A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 13, 104 (Harvard Business School Press 1999). 
10 Carl Cargill, The Informal Versus the Formal Standards Development Process:  Myth 
and Reality, in STANDARDIZATION ESSENTIALS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 257, 260 (Steven 
M. Spivak & F. Cecil Brenner eds., Marcel Dekker, Inc. 2001) [hereinafter ESSENTIALS]. 
11 For example, in the October 2008 survey of ICT standards fora and consortia published 
by the European Committee for Standardization (“CEN”), more than 90% of the 240 
groups listed have roots in the U.S. See European Committee for Standardization, Survey 
of Fora & Consortia, Oct. 2008, 
http://www.cen.eu/cenorm/sectors/sectors/isss/consortia/survey+table+of+content.asp 
(listing standards-related fora and consortia).   
12 For example, traditional SDOs in the United States that have been accredited by the 
American National Standards Institute (see infra note 53 and accompanying text) commit 
to observe the “ANSI Essential Requirements:  Due Process Requirements for American 
National Standards” in their processes.  These include Membership must be open to all 
interested parties; the processes may not be dominated by a single party or interest group 
and efforts should be made to maintain balance among participants; efforts to resolve 
disputes should be undertaken in good faith, notices of standards activities must be 
publicized in a manner likely to encourage the participation of all interested parties; 
opinions of all participants, including dissenting opinions, must be considered before 
standards are finalized; standards should be finalized based on evidence of consensus such 
as voting; and an appeal process should be provided to challenge actions.  See ANSI 
ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS:  DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL 
STANDARDS 4 (2008) [hereinafter ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS], 
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20Na
tional%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/2008%20ANSI%20Esse
ntial%20Requirements/2008%20ANSI%20Essential%20Requirements%20031108.pdf. 
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economic and legal systems vary.13  While the political consensus in 
the U.S. generally favors more individualistic, market-oriented 
institutional approaches to social issues, in many other developed 
economies such as France, Germany, and Japan, the political 
consensus generally favors a greater emphasis on social regulation 
and government coordination.  As a result, SDOs in the U.S. operate 
largely outside any form of government oversight and focus intensely 
on market conditions, while SDOs in more highly regulated economies 
operate within a framework of government oversight and focus on 
regulatory as well as market variables.14  As globalization increases the 
interdependence and integration of what were formerly discrete 
national institutions, these differences in national legal cultures open 
the door to many new forms of regulatory competition.15 
 This article will focus on regulatory competition to set global ICT 
standards.  While not all ICT standards have an impact on human 
behavior, many do have the effect of channeling behavior in particular 
directions in much the same manner that law and other social norms 
do.  In recent decades, ICT standards developed by ICT SDOs with ties 
to U.S. markets have generally enjoyed more success in global markets 
than have those developed by SDOs with ties to other countries or 
regions.16  This success is due to many factors, including the larger 
scale of the ICT sector in the U.S. economy and the greater market-
orientation of traditional American SDOs.  Other factors include the 
greater ability of consortia, a non-traditional form of SDO, to detect or 
determine market trends, to remain narrowly focused on economic 
 
 
 
 
13 Jay Tate, National Varieties of Standardization, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM:  THE 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 442, 442–46 (Peter A. Hall & 
David Soskice eds., Oxford University Press 2001); Ragnar E. Löfstedt & David Vogel, The 
Changing Character of Regulation:  A Comparison of Europe and the United States, 21 
RISK ANALYSIS 399, 399 (2001).  
14 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, GLOBAL STANDARDS:  BUILDING BLOCKS 
FOR THE FUTURE, TCT-512 14 (1992) [hereinafter GLOBAL STANDARDS:  BUILDING BLOCKS 
FOR THE FUTURE], www.strategicstandards.com/files/GlobalStandards.pdf.  
15 See Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Introduction to REGULATORY COMPETITION AND 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES xix, xix–xi (Daniel C. Esty & Damien 
Geradin eds., Oxford University Press 2001); William W. Bratton et al., Introduction:  
Regulatory Competition and Institutional Evolution, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION 1, 1–7 (William W. Bratton et al. eds., Oxford University 
Press 1996). 
16 GREG FITZPATRICK, SWEDISH ICT COMMISSION, THE FAILURE OF EUROPEAN ICT 
STANDARDS POLICY AND A POSSIBLE FUTURE? 10 (2003) [hereinafter SWEDISH ICT 
COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN ICT STANDARDS], www.itkommissionen.se/doc/650.html. 
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factors, and to deflect consideration of social factors in defining the 
scope of their work.  To the extent that ICT standards have the effect 
of regulating human behavior, and to the extent that their content is 
shaped by U.S. economic and legal institutions, the success of SDOs 
with ties to the U.S. in achieving global adoptions of the standards 
they produce may have the effect of exporting U.S. models of 
regulation through the emerging global ICT architecture.  Under 
conditions of trade liberalization, individual end users of ICT products 
and services located outside the U.S. may now have more 
opportunities to defect from highly regulated local markets, and to opt 
into global markets defined by U.S. ICT standards and weaker U.S. 
regulatory standards.  As trade liberalization advances, the process of 
opening up local markets to products that incorporate ICT standards 
has tended to fuel the adoption of standards developed by U.S. ICT 
consortia based on the U.S. market-oriented approach to regulation.17  
ICT standards developed by U.S.-based consortia may often be 
available sooner, and be less expensive to adopt if they permit the 
externalization of social costs, while ICT standards developed in more 
heavily regulated markets outside the U.S. may often take longer to 
finalize and be more expensive to adopt if they require that more 
social costs be internalized.18   
 Switching the framework for analyzing these developments from 
regulatory competition (which often produces zero-sum games) to 
Putnam’s two-level game metaphor shifts the focus to a search for 
outcomes that would be equally acceptable in societies with either 
high or low levels of regulation.  In applying the metaphor of a two-
level game in international relations, the goal is outcomes that are 
recognized as legitimate within each national political system in 
addition to producing a stable outcome at the international level.  In 
the ICT standards arena, the goal is both market adoption and 
political legitimacy within each national economy as well as in 
international trade.  This article will consider under what 
circumstances regulatory competition to set global ICT standards 
might be redirected toward building an institutional framework 
 
 
 
 
17 Andrew Updegrove, Standards, Cycles and Evolution:  Learning from the Past in a New 
Era of Change, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (Consortium Standards Bulletin, Boston, Mass.), 
May 2005, available at http://www.consortiuminfo.org/bulletins/may05.php. 
18 For any given sector of the economy, there exists an empirical question as to whether the 
regulatory framework in the U.S. or EU requires greater internalization of social costs or 
risk minimization; in some economic sectors, the U.S. may be more proactive in regulating 
certain risks than EU countries.  See Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing 
Precaution in the United States and Europe, 5 J. OF RISK RES. 317, 319 (2002). 
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perceived as legitimate within different national political orders, 
supported by a multilateral consensus, and capable of producing 
widely implemented standards.  Of course, such a goal is a very tall 
order, but it may not be as impractical as it may seem at first glance: 
the basic outlines of such a framework may already exist in the Code 
of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards contained in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade.19 
II. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MODERN STANDARDS INSTITUTIONS 
 Standards play a pivotal role in both domestic and international 
economic activity, yet are rarely studied from a social science 
perspective.20  With regard to the role of standards in the U.S. 
economy, where most standards are set by private-sector 
organizations, the author of one of the few books on the political 
economy of American standards setting noted “[t]he universe of 
private standards is massive and mysterious.”21  The relevant data are 
difficult if not impossible to collect, notwithstanding the formal 
commitment of many public standard-developing organizations to 
maintaining transparent processes.  A recent EU study by industry 
experts on standards developments related to radio frequency 
identifiers found that: 
access to information is variable . . . even within 
different ISO committees.  The quality of information 
can certainly improve with insider knowledge that is 
not generally available to the public.  As the authors 
have insider knowledge for some areas, and are 
 
 
 
 
19 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 138.   
20 Tim Büthe, Current and Recent Research Projects and Papers on the Politics of 
Standards, Regulations, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, DUKE UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.duke.edu/~buthe/research/standards_regulation.html (last visited May 23, 
2009).  Some notable exceptions exist. See ROSS E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS:  
REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS (University of California Press 1990); 
MICHELLE P. EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET:  STANDARDS, REGULATION, AND 
GOVERNANCE (Oxford University Press 2001); HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE:  PRODUCT STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING 
MARKETS (Hart Publishing 2005). 
21 CHEIT, supra note 20, at 21. 
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members of the public for others, this is reflected in the 
quality of the analysis.22 
 In non-U.S. developed countries with a tradition of developing 
their own national standards, a single dominant national standards 
body (“NSB”) normally handles the work of standards developing.23  
NSBs may be organized as private sector organizations or government 
agencies.24  At the international level, the International Organization 
for Standardization (“ISO”),25 the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (“IEC”), and the International Telecommunications 
Union (“ITU”), an agency of the United Nations, are recognized as de 
jure international standards organizations.  Countries designate the 
standard developing body that will represent them in these 
international bodies.  NSBs established as government agencies 
generally work closely with other government agencies in charge of 
developing and executing national economic development strategies.26  
In Europe, the work of NSBs is subject to EU law,27 and is coordinated 
with the work of “European Standards Organizations” (“ESOs”) 
including the European Committee for Standardization (“CEN”), the 
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
(“CENELEC”), and the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (“ETSI”).28  The ESOs have made a formal commitment to 
 
 
 
 
22 GLOBAL RFID FORUM FOR STANDARDS (GRIFS), D1.3 RFID STANDARDISATION STATE OF 
THE ART REPORT– VERSION 1 110 (2008) [hereinafter GRIFS], http://www.grifs-
project.eu/data/File/GRIFS%20D1_3%20State%20of%20the%20Art%20Report.pdf. 
23 Examples of such NSBs include the British Standards Institute (“BSI”), Association 
Française de Normalisation (“AFNOR”), Deutsches Institut für Normung e. V.  (“DIN”), 
Japanese Industrial Standards Committee (“JISC”), and Standardization Administration of 
China (“SAC”).  
24 ALAN SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS, 
58–59 (Brookings Institution 1995). 
25 N.B., the name ISO is a standard, not an acronym, so it is the same in all languages. 
26 GLOBAL STANDARDS:  BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 61; Cargill, 
The Informal Versus the Formal Standards Development Process:  Myth and Reality, 
supra note 10, at 22. 
27 See, e.g., Council Resolution 85/C 136/01, 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1, 2 (establishing the “New 
Approach” to European standardization). 
28 Council Directive 98/34/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 204) (EP) (laying down a procedure for the 
provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on 
Information Society Services.).  
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cooperate with ISO and IEC; this commitment forms part of a 
framework of coordination of standard setting that integrates the 
work of European NSBs, ESOs and international SDOs.29  Even in 
countries with a more public, centralized approach to standards 
developing, social scientists studying regulation and government 
economic policies may note the existence of NSBs; but they rarely 
focus their attention directly on the political economy of NSBs 
themselves.30 
 The decades following World War II have seen economic growth 
unparalleled in history, and at the same time, economic 
interdependence among nations has increased sharply.31  With 
economic growth and increased trade, the role of technical standards 
in cross-border trade has increased.  The General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (“GATT”), established in 1947, and the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), established in 1995, have contributed to an 
enormous reduction to explicit barriers to international trade in the 
form of quotas and tariffs.  As explicit barriers have dropped, 
however, the significance of implicit barriers in the form of 
incompatible national standards has grown enormously.32  Under the 
 
 
 
 
29 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO) & EUROPEAN COMMITTEE 
FOR STANDARDIZATION (CEN), AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ISO 
AND CEN (VIENNA AGREEMENT), 
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/3146825/4229629/4230450/4230
458/01__Agreement_on_Technical_Cooperation_between_ISO_and_CEN__Vienna_Ag
reement_.pdf?nodeid=4230688&vernum=0 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). See also Council 
Resolution 2000/C 141/01, 2000 O.J. (C 141) 1, 3–4 (Paragraph 10 notes the importance of 
emphasizing “the role of European standardisation as a means to meet specific needs of the 
European market, to serve the public interest, in particular in support of European 
policies, to provide standards in new domains, to implement international standards in a 
coherent way and, while respecting the independence of national standards bodies, to 
facilitate mutual understanding between Member States’ standards bodies and the 
preparation of coherent positions in international standardisation.”) 
30 Two notable exceptions are Egan and Schepel.  EGAN, supra note 20; SCHEPEL, supra 
note 20.   
31 See generally Henry J. Aaron, et al., Preface to ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR 
INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS (The Brookings Institution 1995); 
INFLUENCING AND MEETING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS:  CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (International Trade Center 2003) [hereinafter INFLUENCING AND MEETING 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS]. 
32 ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS 
MARKETS (The Brookings Institution 1995); INFLUENCING AND MEETING INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS:  CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (International Trade Center 
2003). 
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General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”), issues related to 
standards and trade have been addressed by the voluntary GATT 
Standards Code.33  Within the Uruguay Round of negotiations which 
produced the WTO, obligations governing technical standards 
changed from voluntary to mandatory under the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”).34  As a result of the 
growing impact of standards on trade in goods and under 
international law, the role of standards in international trade has 
attracted more academic attention.35  Such attention is dwarfed, 
however, by the attention given to the WTO dispute settlement 
system.36    
 Although it is never easy to explain “why the dog didn’t bark,”37 it 
is possible to hazard some guesses as to why the political economy of 
modern standards institutions remains nearly invisible to legal 
academics and social scientists.  Most participants in modern SDOs 
have scientific or engineering backgrounds, and many of the issues 
they resolve are highly technical in nature, making it difficult for social 
scientists lacking a technical background to separate the technical 
from political issues.38  In situations such as those where there are no 
 
 
 
 
33 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (with Annexes), Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 
276.   
34 See ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 12, at 120. 
35 See, e.g., SYKES, supra note 32.   
36 For example, a 2002 bibliography of publications about the WTO dispute resolution 
publication in English contained over 200 hundred entries.  See Barbara Monroe, WTO 
Dispute Settlement Procedure Bibliography, Dec. 2002, 
www.law.georgetown.edu/iiel/research/projects/dsureview/documents/dsubib.doc; 
However, in 2009, an online search for U.S. law review articles analyzing issues related to 
WTO TBT agreement in depth turned up only 24 entries.  Query– “WTO TBT,” WESTLAW, 
www.westlaw.com (using the Journals & Law Reviews database, type in “WTO TBT”).  A 
leading trade law textbook over 1500 pages long omits coverage of the TBT altogether.  See 
Raj Bhala, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:  INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE (3d ed., 
LexisNexis 2008). 
37 However, Sherlock Holmes did manage to discern why the dog did not bark in one 
murder case (the murderer was the dog’s master).  ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in 
SHERLOCK HOLMES:  THE COMPLETE NOVELS AND STORIES VOLUME I 455, 475 (Bantam 
Books 1986). 
38 In 1972, Laura Nader famously commented on a similar situation in anthropology.  
Laura Nader, Up the Anthropologist:  Perspectives Gained from Studying Up, in 
REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY 284 (Dell Hymes ed., Pantheon Books 1972).  She demanded 
that more anthropologists should “study-up” (meaning study elite rather than oppressed 
groups in society), but also ventured a guess as to why so few do:  “anthropologists value 
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incumbent technologies already on the market, it may be possible for 
competitors to base decisions largely on technical variables with 
minimal political conflict.  In other situations, however, the 
participants in standard-setting processes understand very clearly the 
distributional effects of different outcomes, and fight hard to advance 
their private interests.  While participants in standard-developing 
processes may have a very sophisticated understanding of the politics 
of standards setting, they have few incentives to write about their 
understanding of those processes in the form of academic 
commentary and to try to publish those commentaries in social 
science journals.  Non-participants may simply be unaware of the 
magnitude of the political conflicts that technical personnel resolve 
within standard-setting processes, or may mistakenly believe that 
most issues can be resolved with reference to scientific rather than 
political criteria.  In-depth analyses of the politics of standard-setting 
organizations by American legal academics have tended to focus on 
the impact of antitrust or intellectual property law on the standards 
they produce, rather than SDOs as institutions.39   
 The politics of ICT standards may be a slightly more glamorous 
and visible topic than the politics of traditional standards bodies, but 
there remain few in-depth studies of ICT standards as social 
institutions.  While many commentators on the politics of 
“cyberspace” have noted that information technology may regulate 
human behavior in much the same way laws do,40 and while the 
relationship between the work of SDOs and the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights has recently become a subject of intense 
                                                                                                                   
studying what they like and liking what they study . . . .”  Id.  It is this author’s opinion that, 
presumably, most social scientists do not much like engineers, given that social institutions 
dominated by engineers, such as SDOs, are so little studied by social scientists. 
39 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1891–92 (National Fire Protection Association 
2002).  Some exceptions exist, however.  See, e.g., ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., STANDARDS 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR:  THOUGHTS ON INTEREST REPRESENTATION AND 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 5–8 (1978) (listing fear of underrepresentation of consumers and 
small business as well as anticompetitive effects as sources of concern about private 
standards making).   
40 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS:  SPACE, PLACE AND THE INFOBAHN 111 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1995) (“Out there on the electronic frontier, code is 
the law.”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy 
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 553–55 (1998); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (Basic Books 1999); Mitch Kapor’s Blog, 
http://blog.kapor.com/?p=29 (April 23, 2006, 10:56 EST). 
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controversy,41 there have been few in-depth studies of ICT SDOs as a 
source of regulatory norms.42 
 Although standards are as old as commerce itself,43 demand for 
standardization increased sharply in the 19th century, resulting in the 
emergence of new institutions for developing responsive standards 
more quickly and effectively.  Modern technical standards are thus 
one by-product of the Industrial Revolution, developed in response to 
the need to increase the coordination among large-scale producers of 
increasingly complex manufactured products operating in national 
and international markets.44  By the mid-20th century, standards and 
SDOs had come to play an essential role in the process of regulating 
industrial economies.45  In 1979, the importance of regulations 
concerning technical standards and conformity assessment 
procedures to international trade was given official, but limited, 
recognition when the GATT Standards Code was added to GATT 
because accession to the Standards Code was optional for GATT 
members, and few countries adopted it.  When the WTO was 
established in 1995, accession to the TBT was made a mandatory part 
of WTO membership.  The regulatory and economic significance of 
technical standards has increased steadily with the growth of 
international trade in recent decades.46  As of 2005, some estimates 
put the volume of international trade in goods subject to standard-
related measures at eighty percent.47  
 
 
 
 
41 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 39; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  PROMOTING INNOVATION 
AND COMPETITION (Apr. 2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.   
42 But see, e.g., Tineke M. Egyedi & Sebastiano Toffaletti, Standardising Social 
Responsibility:  Analysing ISO Representation Issues From an SME Perspective, in 
PROCEEDINGS 13TH EURAS WORKSHOP ON STANDARDISATION 121–36 (Kai Jakobs & Eva 
Soederstroem eds., 2007). 
43 ESSENTIALS, supra note 10, at 7. 
44 SUZANNE BERGER, HOW WE COMPETE 9–16 (Currency Doubleday 2005); KRISLOV, supra 
note 5, at 21–22. 
45 KRISLOV, supra note 4, at 49. 
46 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT AND TRADE: INTO 
THE 21ST CENTURY 107–08 (National Academy Press 1995). 
47 U.S. Dep’t of State, United States Combating Use of Standards as Trade Barriers, May 
13, 2005, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2005/May/20050513162339ajesroM0.5901605.html; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), STANDARDS AND CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT IN TRADE:  
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 The onset of the Information Revolution toward the end of the 
20th century fueled growth in ICT standards and standard-setting 
processes in much the same way that the Industrial Revolution fueled 
the growth of product standards in the 19th century.  However, the first 
global ICT standards organizations had been established much earlier 
to facilitate interoperability among local, national, and international 
telegraph and telephone networks.  In 1865, representatives of 20 
countries signed the first International Telegraph Convention; and the 
International Telegraph Union was established to facilitate 
subsequent amendments to the treaty.48  In 1934, it merged with the 
International Radiotelegraph Union to form the ITU; and in 1947, it 
became a specialized agency of the United Nations.  In furtherance of 
its mission to maintain interconnections among domestic telephone 
systems, the ITU continues to support the development of ICT 
standards and is a leading example of a “de jure” international ICT 
standards body.  Although ICT standards have played a foundational 
role in global integration of markets for more than a century, until 
recent decades, they were overshadowed in economic and political 
significance by product standards for goods. 
 In recent decades, a particularly aggressive new form of SDO 
emerged from the U.S. standard-developing system which has given 
the U.S. system a decisive edge in global regulatory competition to set 
ICT standards in global markets.  In order to promote private-sector 
involvement in standards developing and reduce overlapping research 
efforts, the U.S. enacted legislation which removed regulatory 
obstacles to the growth of consortia in 1984 with the National 
Cooperative Research Act,49 and in 1993 with the National 
Cooperative Research and Production Act (“NCRPA”).50  The NCRPA 
was originally drafted to encourage research and development by 
making it clear that the impact of a joint research and development or 
production venture should be assessed under the more liberal “rule of 
reason” standard, and provides limited protection from antitrust 
                                                                                                                   
MINIMISING BARRIERS AND MAXIMISING BENEFITS 194 (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/27/36223999.pdf. 
48 Int’l Telecomm. Union (“ITU”), ITU’s History, 
http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/overview/history.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
49 National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815. 
50 National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 
117. See also, The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004,  
Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (further extending the provisions of the NCRPA to 
standards development organizations). 
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liability to standard-developing consortia that follow NCRPA 
notification procedures.51 
 These legislative reforms only exacerbated a fundamental 
difference between the basic U.S. approach to standards development 
and the approach taken by all other leading developed economies.  
The U.S. system of developing standards is decentralized and largely 
in the hands of private enterprises.  The American National Standards 
Institute (“ANSI”) helps to oversee and coordinate the U.S. system of 
standards development and represents U.S. SDOs at ISO, the 
multilateral international standards organization.  Unlike NSBs in 
other countries, however, it does not itself develop standards.52  
Around 200 U.S. SDOs are “ANSI accredited” which means that they 
observe minimum due process standards known as “ANSI Essential 
Requirements.”53  One benefit to American SDOs of becoming ANSI 
accredited is that it is easier for them to have their standards 
submitted to ISO for recognition as international standards.  One 
drawback is that greater openness and transparency in procedures 
may slow down the standard-setting process or make it easier for 
uncooperative parties to obstruct their work.  While many traditional 
U.S. SDOs are ANSI-accredited, non-traditional U.S. SDOs such as 
consortia are not ANSI-accredited precisely because such a 
commitment to transparency might slow them down or distract their 
focus from the immediate goals of their members.  Because the U.S. 
system relies even more heavily on private-sector initiative than do 
the standards systems of other developed economies, U.S. observers 
are fond of describing it as a “bottom up” system unlike the “top 
down” system favored by other countries. This characterization is 
generally rejected by non-U.S. observers, however, who point out that 
even outside the U.S., standards setting is normally undertaken in 
response to private-sector demand, and the role of NSBs is normally 
limited to helping coordinate work undertaken largely by private-
sector entities.  Whether or not the “top down/bottom up” distinction 
is accurate, it is clear that ANSI-accredited SDOs generally operate in 
a more decentralized, market-oriented environment than do NSBs in 
other developed market economies, and that U.S.-based consortia 
 
 
 
 
51 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL 11–29 (2008), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/atrdivman.pdf. 
52 Cargill, supra note 8, at 244. 
53 American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), Introduction to ANSI, 
http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/introduction.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 
2009). 
200 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 5:2 
 
 
operate in an even more decentralized, market-oriented manner than 
ANSI-accredited SDOs. 
 The difference between the U.S. approach to standards developing 
and the approach taken by other developed market economies is one 
manifestation of a larger difference in regulatory institutions.  Political 
scientists distinguish between “coordinated market economies” 
(“CMEs”) such as Germany or Japan, and “liberal market economies” 
(“LMEs”) such as the United States.  The distinction is based on the 
most common forms of business organizations and the preponderance 
of either market or relational institutions.54  One way to characterize 
some of the institutional differences this distinction attempts to 
capture is that CMEs have favored a “producerist” approach to 
economic regulation (which focuses on labor-management relations, 
and relations among enterprises), while the U.S. has favored a 
“consumerist” approach (which focuses on competition in retail 
markets).55  In recent years, some observers have argued that CMEs 
favor the precautionary principle more strongly than do LMEs, 
although this assertion has been the subject of considerable 
controversy.56  Perhaps less controversial is the general observation 
that regulatory regimes for managing risk vary from country to 
country, and that some societies, which happen to include most LMEs, 
adopt a more “individualist” approach to the management of risk, 
while other societies, which happen to include many leading CMEs, 
take a more “hierarchical” approach to the management of risk.57  
With regard to generalizations about differences in LME and CME 
approaches to risk, it is clear that the U.S. system of standards 
developing, like many other American economic institutions, focuses 
on market incentives and tends to externalize many social costs, while 
standard-developing systems organized around an NSB place a 
greater emphasis on central coordination of economic activity and can 
internalize social costs more effectively.  Under conditions of global 
regulatory competition to set ICT standards, it should hardly be 
surprising that ICT SDOs with roots in the U.S. standards system are 
 
 
 
 
54  Hall & Soskice, supra note 13, at 8. 
55 James Q. Whitman, Consumerism versus Producerism:  A Study in Comparative Law, 
117 YALE L.J. 340, 340 (2007). 
56 David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited:  The New Politics of Consumer and 
Environmental Regulation in Europe, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 557, 557 (2003). 
57 CHRISTOPHER HOOD, HENRY ROTHSTEIN & ROBERT BALDWIN, THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK:  
UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION REGIMES 13 (Oxford University Press 2001). 
2009] WINN 201 
 
 
able to compete more effectively in the struggle to define the emerging 
global information architecture than are SDOs with roots in CMEs.  
 Drafting economic regulations that refer to or incorporate 
technical standards can be very difficult.  If not done correctly, 
references to technical standards can quickly become anachronistic, 
contribute to market failures in a myriad of different ways, or 
otherwise prove challenging to administer.58  Stephen Breyer noted 
that efforts to craft regulations based on technical standards are 
plagued with endemic problems, including information asymmetries 
between regulators and participants in standard developing processes, 
coordination problems, enforcement problems, and anticompetitive 
effects.59  While these remain chronic problems for U.S. regulators, 
European regulators have developed legislative strategies to reduce 
these problems that are well suited to regulation within CMEs.   
 During the process of building the internal market, the EU 
established a framework known as the “New Approach” to 
standardization to reduce technical barriers to trade among member 
states.60  Before the New Approach, efforts to harmonize technical 
standards in the internal market were based on “approximation of 
laws,” which required the development of broad, mandatory 
standards, and which resulted in political deadlock as member states 
fought to block the adoption of standards that might put their 
domestic producers at a strategic disadvantage.61  This rigid, 
hierarchical approach also created a risk of technological obsolescence 
problems due to the delay in adopting harmonized standards and the 
difficulty of revising them.  The New Approach solved political, legal 
and technological problems with the process: once legislation has 
been prepared that requires an associated technical standard in order 
to be implemented effectively, then an associated European 
 
 
 
 
58 For example, the copyright status of privately developed standards referenced in state or 
local laws is ambiguous under U.S. law. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l Inc., 293 
F.3d 791, 800, 802, 807–08 (5th Cir. 2002). 
59 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 109–16 (Harvard University Press 
1982). 
60 Council Directive 83/189/EEC, 1983 O.J. (L 109) 8 (laying down a procedure for the 
provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations), amended by 
Council and European Parliament Directive 98/48/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 217) 18. 
61 EGAN, supra note 20, at 78–81. 
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standardization effort is initiated by one of the EU standards bodies.62  
The Commission sends an observer to the standard-developing 
process but otherwise the process of developing the technical standard 
remains unchanged.63  The resulting standard establishes a “safe 
harbor” for regulated entities: compliance with the standard is strictly 
voluntary, but proof of conformity with that standard creates a 
presumption of compliance with the corresponding law.64  If the 
standard becomes outdated, it can be replaced by withdrawing the 
first standard and publishing a new standard in the official journal; 
but no changes need be made in the text of the directive or by any 
member state implementing legislation.65  Although political and 
technological challenges remain in the process of harmonizing 
product standards to remove barriers to trade in the internal market, 
the New Approach is generally regarded as a very successful CME 
regulatory strategy.66 
 The significance of technical barriers to trade and regulatory 
competition in the area of ICT standards was clear by the late 1980s, 
when the commitment to create what is now known as the GSM 
(originally Groupe Spécial Mobile, later Global System for Mobile 
communications) network was made by European regulators.67  
 
 
 
 
62 This is the “general reference to standards” formula (renvoi aux norms) statute drafting 
technique that was first used in the Low Voltage Directive and is a hallmark of New 
Approach legislation.  EGAN, supra note 20, at 118. 
63 The relationship between the Commission and ESOs regarding Commission mandates 
for the development of technical standards to support New Approach directives, including 
payments by the Commission to ESOs, is governed by a memorandum of understanding 
and guidelines for cooperation between the Commission and the ESOs.  Id.  at 124. 
64 Council Resolution (EC) No 85/C 136/01 of 7 May 1985, O.J. (C 136),3 (“[n]ational 
authorities are obliged to recognize that products manufactured in conformity with 
harmonized standards (or, provisionally, with national standards) are presumed to 
conform to the “essential requirements” established by the Directive.  This signifies that 
the producer has the choice of not manufacturing in conformity with the standards but that 
in this event he has an obligation to prove that his products conform to the essential 
requirements of the Directive.”). 
65 Id.  
66 Jacques Pelkmans, The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization, 25 J. COMMON MKT. STUDS. 249, 253, 267 (1987); but see also Andrew 
McGee & Stephen Weatherill, The Evolution of the Single Market– Harmonisation or 
Liberalisation, 53 MOD. L. REV. 578, 595 (1990) (concluding that the New Approach 
provides more access to commercial interests than to consumer interests). 
67 Jacques Pelkmans, The GSM Standard:  Explaining a Success Story, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 432, 433–35 (2001) [hereinafter The GSM Standard]. 
2009] WINN 203 
 
 
European countries had lagged behind the U.S. in adoption rates for 
analog mobile phone service, and there was widespread consensus 
that an integrated approach was essential to increase European 
adoption rates for digital mobile phone service.68  As a result of many 
legal, political, economic, and technical compromises, when the GSM 
system was launched, it was an immediate success in Europe and was 
quickly adopted in many other countries around the world, becoming 
the most successful mobile phone standard in the world.69  By 
contrast, U.S. regulators relinquished the role they had played in 
coordinating standards for analog mobile telephony and allowed 
competition among different standards to emerge with the switch to 
digital mobile telephony.  The result was a decade of bad service and 
high prices for U.S. mobile phone customers as competing service 
providers built overlapping incompatible networks in certain areas, 
while leaving other areas of the country without coverage.70 
 At around the same time that the GSM model showed the benefits 
of the CME approach to ICT standardization, the emergence of the 
Internet showed its shortcomings.  The explosive growth of the 
Internet that commenced in the late 1980s began around the same 
time that informal ICT SDOs emerged within the U.S. standards 
system.  Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) is an informal 
private SDO that has sponsored the development of many essential 
Internet standards since its founding in 1986.71  At that time, IETF 
took over management of the Internet Protocol Suite,72 which had 
been developed in 1981 by the U.S. Department of Defense.  It now 
coordinates the work of hundreds of working groups developing 
 
 
 
 
68 Sandor Bakalis, Muriel Abeln & Enid Mante, The Adoption and Use of Mobile Telephony 
in Europe, in COMMUNICATIONS ON THE MOVE: THE EXPERIENCE OF MOBILE TELEPHONY IN 
THE 1990S (Leslie Haddon ed., 1997), available at 
http://www.cost269.org/Cost248/2_ADOPT.doc. 
69 Global GSM Subscriber Growth Rate to Slow in 2008, CELLULAR-NEWS, Apr. 7, 2008, 
http://www.cellular-news.com/story/30361.php?source=newsletter. 
70 Pelkmans, The GSM Standard, supra note 67, at 448. 
71 Kaushik Das, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), IPV6.COM, 
http://www.ipv6.com/articles/organizations/IETF-History-IPv6.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 
2009). 
72 The Internet Protocol Suite is based on the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) standard, defined in INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL:  DARPA INTERNET PROGRAM 
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION (1981), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc793.txt. 
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various standards in some way related to the Internet Protocol Suite.  
While the IETF is clearly an informal ICT SDO because it lacks the 
kind of de jure mandate that ISO or ITU have, it is more of a “forum” 
than a “consortium” because of the large scale of participation in its 
projects and the openness of its processes.  Although processes at the 
highest levels of IETF management may be somewhat opaque, 
standard-developing processes carried out by working groups are 
generally very open and transparent, and represent the collaborative 
efforts of thousands of volunteers from around the world.  In 1994, the 
World Wide Web Consortium (“W3C”) was established at MIT under 
the leadership of Tim Berners-Lee and, like the IETF, is now a leading 
global ICT standards forum responsible for the development of many 
Internet standards.  Like the IETF, activities of W3C working groups 
are open, transparent and involve thousands of individuals around the 
world.73 
 The Internet Protocol Suite and the work of the IETF completely 
eclipsed a much more formal effort established in 1981 by ISO and the 
ITU to create a global ICT networking standard known as “Open 
Systems Interconnection” (“OSI”).74  During the 1980s, the IETF was 
still a relatively small, collegial organization, while the OSI effort was 
carried out on a large scale with formal procedures.  As a result, the 
Internet Protocol Suite was already in widespread use by the time the 
OSI standards were finished.  The OSI effort was more politicized than 
the IETF because its work was carried out by dozens of NSBs 
competing for tactical advantages rather than a handful of engineers.  
As a result, many of the design decisions in the final OSI standard are 
problematic from a technological perspective, having been adopted to 
resolve political conflicts.  While the OSI standards were more 
comprehensive than the IETF standards, addressing in depth issues 
such as security that were given short shrift when IETF standards 
were developed and achieved global adoption, they were also much 
more complex and difficult to implement.75  The dominance of IETF 
and W3C in Internet standards arenas represents the triumph of 
informal ICT standards forums with roots in the U.S. standards 
system at the expense of formal de jure international ICT standards 
 
 
 
 
73 Internet Engineering Task Force, Wikipedia entry, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IETF; 
World Wide Web Consortium, Wikipedia entry, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W3c. 
74 ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 46 (4th ed. Prentice Hall PTR 2003). 
75 Id. at 46–48. 
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bodies like the ITU with stronger ties to European standards 
systems.76 
 In the decades following the global adoption of the GSM standard 
and the Internet Protocol Suite, the EU has not enjoyed any successes 
of the magnitude of the GSM in the global regulatory competition to 
establish ICT standards.  For example, the EU chose to regulate online 
authentication systems with the 1999 Electronic Signature Directive, 
while the U.S. chose to let market forces determine the appropriate 
authentication technology and degree of standardization rather than 
regulate commercial practice in this area. 77  In the 2000s, these EU 
efforts have led regulators and EU businesses up a blind alley as they 
try to implement digital signature and public key infrastructure 
systems that failed to achieve market acceptance in the 1990s.  Less 
regulated markets in the U.S. have developed a new approach known 
as “federated identity management” to deal with authentication 
problems.  Informal ICT SDOs have produced new standards to 
promote the adoption of federated identity management systems, 
such as the Security Assertion Markup Language (“SAML”)78 and 
OpenID,79 which are rapidly gaining acceptance in global markets.80  
While these new U.S. standards have yet to enjoy the same degree of 
success that the Internet did relative to the OSI framework, they are 
nevertheless enjoying more success in global markets than are EU 
efforts to mandate a particular approach to strong authentication 
technologies.81 
 
 
 
 
76 FITZPATRICK, SWEDISH ICT COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN ICT STANDARDS, supra note 16.  
77 Jane K. Winn, U.S. and EU Regulatory Competition and Authentication Standards in 
Electronic Commerce, 5 INT’L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 84, 84 (2007). 
78 Id.  (SAML is an XML standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data 
between security domains).  See generally Security Assertion Markup Language, Cover 
Pages, http://xml.coverpages.org/saml.html (last visited May 23, 2009). 
79 OpenID is a decentralized, user-centric single-sign on authentication system for the 
Internet.  See generally What is OpenID?, OpenID, http://openid.net/what/ (last visited 
May 23, 2009). 
80 Winn, supra note 77, at 93. 
81 In 2007, a study undertaken for Commission DG Information Society identified many 
problems related to the Electronic Signature Directive which were contributing to lack of 
adoption of the technology in Europe.  See SEALED, DLA Paper, and Across 
Communications, STUDY ON THE STANDARDISATION ASPECTS OF ESIGNATURE, (2007), 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/docs/esignatures/e_signatures_
standardisation.pdf.  In 2009, the Commission DG Taxation and Customs called for the 
elimination of electronic signature requirements from e-invoicing regulations, citing them 
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 In 2008, the European Commission initiated a public debate on 
the disadvantages suffered by ICT SDOs rooted in CMEs in the 
competition to set global ICT standards, and to identify strategies for 
changing the terms of global regulatory competition to set ICT 
standards.82  The simplest solution—to grant legal recognition as 
“European Standards” to any standards developed by de facto private 
consortia that appear to meet the needs of European consumers and 
producers—is not politically viable.  The Commission has been 
working with ESOs for many years to try to develop new standards 
processes that are politically viable within Europe and that produce 
ICT standards that are economically viable outside Europe, but these 
efforts have yet to produce any successes of the magnitude of GSM.  
The Commission’s new initiative was designed to identify a middle 
ground: increase the scope of the dialogue between EU regulators and 
informal ICT standards consortia while also working for modest 
reforms in European standards institutions to permit them to respond 
more effectively to global market demands.  Deliberative processes 
within the Commission started in 2008,83 but it may take years before 
reforms are made as a result of those deliberations. 
III. CHANGING THE LOGIC OF TWO-LEVEL GAMES 
 The growth of informal de jure ICT SDOs at the expense of formal 
de jure ICT SDOs is yet another manifestation of the “real new world 
order” dominated by networks of informal institutions in lieu of 
hierarchical multilateral institutions.84  The real challenge facing 
regulators outside the U.S. opposed to their growing influence is 
therefore not to stop the adoption of consortia standards, but to 
ensure that their adoption serves the same interests that were served 
by the work of traditional SDOs.  In order to accomplish this, changes 
                                                                                                                   
as a major barrier to the adoption of e-invoicing by European businesses.  See, Press 
Release, Europa, VAT: Commission Proposes a Review of the VAT Rules on invoicing with 
a View to Reduce Burdens on Business and to Help Member States Tackle Fraud  
(Jan. 28, 2009), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/132. 
82 DG ENTERPRISE, EUROPEAN ICT STANDARDISATION POLICY AT A CROSSROADS: A NEW 
DIRECTION FOR GLOBAL SUCCESS 2 (2008), 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ict/policy/standards/cf2008/080206-dispaper.pdf 
[hereinafter THE WAY FORWARD]. 
83 Id.  
84 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997). 
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will be required in the governance framework within which consortia 
operate.  One of the lessons of the “new governance” is the importance 
of matching the right regulatory instrument with whatever challenge 
is under consideration.  Furthermore, a dynamic strategy of changing 
regulatory instruments in light of circumstances may also be 
necessary to increase the effectiveness of regulation.  For example, 
Ayres and Braithwaite have argued that in many regulatory 
environments, a “pyramid of regulatory strategies” is likely to be the 
most effective approach.85  The base of the pyramid is informal 
enforcement strategies which can be replaced with increasingly 
punitive enforcement strategies in response to manifestations of 
disregard for less punitive efforts.  While traditional product 
standards may be soft law if voluntary, or hard law if made mandatory 
by incorporation into or reference from legislation,86 when the 
adoption of ICT standards is driven by strong network effects, the 
regulatory effect of those standards may exceed that of even “hard” 
law.87  This technologically enhanced hard mandate is directly at odds 
with the idea of calibrating enforcement mechanisms based on risk 
and the potential for collaborative outcomes.  While an ICT standards 
“mandate” enforced by strong network effects may be perceived as 
legitimate in some LME national political systems, it may be opposed 
as illegitimate in others, such as CME systems, especially if it impedes 
compliance with national social regulations such as privacy laws.   
 The most obvious way to minimize ex post political resistance to 
such ICT standards mandates would be to increase ex ante 
collaboration among countries in the development of standards before 
they are widely adopted.  While this was successful in the case of GSM, 
it has proven difficult to reproduce that success.  The challenge 
currently facing ICT SDOs based in Europe is that, under conditions 
of trade liberalization, products can be sold directly to European 
 
 
 
 
85 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 39 (Oxford University Press 1992). 
86 John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction:  Hard Choices, and Soft Law in 
Sustainable Global Governance, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW:  VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN 
GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 8–10 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. 
Trebilcock eds., Ashgate 2004).  Soft law consists of rules which are neither strictly binding 
nor completely void of any legal significance; with time these may “harden” into customary 
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producers and consumers that incorporate consortia-based standards, 
resulting in ad hoc recognition of de facto standards before de jure 
standards can be completed.  Under conditions of trade liberalization, 
it would be difficult as a practical matter and politically controversial 
for EU regulators to block access in local markets to products based 
on consortia standards.88  Borrowing from Hirschman, the EU system 
of developing ICT standards relies on the milder discipline imposed by 
systems of “voice” accountability enforced by long-term political 
processes, while the U.S. system of developing ICT standards relies on 
the harsher discipline of “exit” accountability enforced by markets.89 
 Another option for EU regulators might be to shift from a “voice” 
system based on direct participation of interested parties in the 
process of standards developing to a system based on a modified form 
of “exit” (perhaps more properly called “entrance”) after they have 
been developed.  In this context, however, CME regulators might offer 
to consortia formal ex post ratification of their standards under 
certain conditions that have been clearly specified in advance.  While 
the EU has well-developed mechanisms, such as the “New Approach” 
to harmonizing legislation with product standards developed by de 
jure EU SDOs, there are not yet well-developed mechanisms to permit 
formal legal recognition of ICT standards that have been developed by 
de facto ICT SDOs outside of the EU system of de jure ESOs.90  In its 
2008 consultation, the Commission suggested that a reform of EU law 
to permit such ex post recognition might be appropriate, or even 
 
 
 
 
88 The WTO recognizes certain general exceptions to the duty to obligation permit trade 
with other members in WTO Agreement Article XX which inter alia provides:  “Subject to 
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures: . . . (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; . . . (d) 
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement . . . [and] (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption; . . .” Objections to free trade in “smart” goods that 
embody consortia standards rather than de jure standards would not be covered by any 
WTO exceptions.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/issu4_e.htm#gatt20.  
89 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 3–5 (Harvard University Press 1970). 
90 THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 82.  
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necessary, to achieve EU policy objectives in ICT arenas.91  Given the 
often intense competition among de facto SDOs to achieve a critical 
mass of adoptions for their standards, articulating the conditions for 
ex post ratification might create powerful incentives to some consortia 
to increase the transparency and accountability of their processes ex 
ante. 
 National and international processes for insuring the transparency 
and accountability of de facto ICT SDOs are generally much less 
developed than similar processes for conventional product 
standards.92  Consortia have emerged as major players in standards 
arenas very recently, operating largely in economic arenas dominated 
by the U.S. at the same time that U.S. political institutions were 
generally enamored with deregulation and opposed to regulation.  
Liberalization of national telecommunications and product markets 
ushered in by the WTO has made it possible for a handful of ICT 
product developers to form consortia, develop and implement ICT 
product standards and market finished products to end users around 
the world without reference to the formal international standards 
bodies.  As a result, consortia are often able to evade oversight within 
the conventional international standards framework developed since 
WWII and centered on ISO, ITU and IEC.   
 Within the system of de jure international standards, the 
possibility of recognition as a de jure international standard 
recognized by ISO and distributed throughout the world might once 
have provided strong incentives to stay within the de jure system.  The 
success of IETF and W3C in setting global Internet standards without 
the imprimatur of ISO, ITU or IEC has undermined those incentives.  
In the de jure international standards systems, recognized NSBs may 
submit national standards to ISO for adoption as international 
standards.93  For example, the ISO 9000 standard, first issued by ISO 
in 1987 and subsequently updated several times, began life in 1979 as 
BS 5750 issued by BSI, the British NSB formerly known as the British 
Institute.  In the U.S., standards developed by ANSI Accredited SDOs 
may be designated as “American Standards” and sent on to ISO for 
consideration as international standards.  The possibility of 
recognition by ISO at some point in the future is too weak an incentive 
 
 
 
 
91 Id. 
92 Updegrove, supra note 17. 
93 ISO/IEC DIRECTIVES, PART 1:  PROCEDURES FOR THE TECHNICAL WORK 62 (2008), 
http://www.iec.ch/tiss/iec/Directives-Part1-Ed6.pdf. 
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to bring any ICT standards consortia to see ANSI certification.  
Successful consortia target end users in global markets directly in 
order to achieve de facto market-based recognition, disregarding de 
jure politically based recognition procedures administered by ISO. 
 The recent controversy in the EU surrounding the widespread 
adoption of radio frequency identifier (“RFID”) technology illustrates 
how market acceptance of de facto ICT standards can pose problems 
for regulators limited to working with formal ICT SDOs, as well as 
suggesting what a possible solution’s features might include.  RFID 
technology permits automatic identification and data capture by 
means of radio communications.  RFID systems include a tag that can 
receive radio signals and that can store, and possibly even process, 
information; a reader that transmits and detects radio waves returned 
from tags; and a system for collecting data.  World War II pilots used 
the earliest predecessor to modern RFID system to help their ground 
crews detect whether an incoming plane was a “friend or foe.”94  Work 
began on the first RFID standard relevant to current mass-market 
applications in the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1/SC 31 in 
1997.95  In 1999, the Uniform Code Council,96 EAN International,97 
Proctor & Gamble, and Gillette provided funding to the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology to establish the Auto-ID Center, which 
developed the network communications model currently in use in 
mass-market RFID applications.98  Since then, many major 
multinational corporations have worked to develop a wide range of 
commercial applications for this technology.  During the 2000s, RFID 
tags came into widespread use in certain sectors.99  GS1, the successor 
 
 
 
 
94 The History of RFID Technology, RFID Journal, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/1338/1/129 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).   
95 GRIFS, supra note 22, at 110. 
96 The Uniform Code Council was in charge of standards for “universal product code” bar 
codes in the U.S.  See GS1 US, ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2005), 
http://www.gs1us.org/pdf/Annual_Report2005.pdf.  In 2005, it changed its name to GS1 
US.  Id. at 7.     
97 European Article Numbering (“EAN”) International was in charge of standards for 
“universal product code” bar codes in Europe.  In 2005, it changed its name to GS1.  EAN 
INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2003/2004 8 (2003/2004), 
http://www.gs1.org/docs/publications/annual_report/annual_report_2003_2004.pdf.   
98 The History of RFID Technology, supra note 94. 
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to the Uniform Code Council and EAN International, emerged as the 
most important international RFID standard-developing 
organization.100  GS1 is a standard-developing consortium, and its 
members include business enterprises from around the world.101  In 
2003, GS1 together with GS1 U.S. formed EPCglobal, a global 
membership organization that works to promote the adoption of 
“electronic product codes” and RFID technology.102  EPCglobal 
develops standards, provides conformity certification for products, 
accredits other organizations to provide conformity testing, and 
provides training, marketing and political advocacy for RFID products 
and services.103  Due in part to the promotional efforts of SDOs and 
trade associations such as EPCglobal, adoption rates for RFID 
technologies were increasing in the U.S. and in Europe.104 
 Although concern among privacy advocates about potentially 
invasive uses of RFID technology had been expressed since the early 
2000s,105 the controversy surrounding privacy and security issues 
created by unregulated commercial RFID applications escalated 
dramatically when Vivian Reding, Commissioner for Information 
                                                                                                                   
99 K.C. Jones, Interest Increasing in RFID Applications, Survey Shows, INFO. WK.,  
Aug. 7, 2008, 
www.informationweek.com/news/mobility/RFID/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=20990439
7. 
100 Wikipedia, European Article Number-Uniform Code Council, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Article_Numbering-Uniform_Code_Council (last 
visited Apr.15, 2009). 
101 Wikipedia, GS1, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GS1 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
102 GS1, Timeline, http://www.gs1.org/about/media_centre/timeline.html (last visited Apr. 
15, 2009). 
103 GS1, Overview About EPC Global, 
http://www.gs1.org/productssolutions/epcglobal/overview.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2009). 
104 See generally EPCGLOBAL RESPONSE TO EU RFID ONLINE CONSULTATION (2006),  
http://www.rfidconsultation.eu/docs/ficheiros/EPCglobal_Response_to_EU_RFID_Onli
ne_Consultation.pdf 
105 See generally Electronic Privacy Information Center, Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) System, May 13, 2009, http://epic.org/privacy/rfid/ (listing privacy concerns such 
as invasive profiling of consumer preferences through undisclosed, nonconsensual 
monitoring of consumer behavior). 
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Society, launched a public consultation in 2006.106  The public 
consultation was intended to establish global standards for RFID 
technology and insure their compliance with EU data protection laws.  
A Commission Communication followed this in 2007 articulating the 
twin EU goals of harnessing RFID as a tool to promote innovation and 
growth as well as insuring that its use complies with EU law.107  In 
2008, work began on several projects designed to help coordinate the 
EU response to RFID developments and contribute to the 
development of EU-compliant RFID technologies, including 
Coordination and Support Action for Global RFID-Related Activities 
and Standardisation (“CASAGRAS”), the Global RFID Interoperability 
Forum for Standards (“GRIFS”), and the Cluster for European RFID 
Projects (“CERP”), all of which received major funding through the 
Seventh Framework Programme, the EU’s primary program for 
funding scientific research.108    
 Although the EU response to regulatory challenges created by 
rapid adoption of RFID technology has been multifaceted and broad, 
it has also tended to proceed on bureaucratic time rather than 
Internet time.  As of the time of this essay’s publication, it is too soon 
to know what impact EU efforts to change the institutional framework 
within which RFID products and standards are developed and used 
will have in global markets.  In order to overcome the “privacy 
invasive” character of RFID standards developed in industry-
dominated consortia over the last decade with little input from end 
users or regulators, significant changes in the design of commercial 
RFID systems will be needed.  In response to the 2007 Commission 
Communication, Peter Hustinx, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (“EDPS”), issued an opinion in 2008 arguing that not 
enough was being done to ensure that RFID applications were 
 
 
 
 
106 How the Debate Started, Europe’s Information Society, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/rfid/eu_approach/how_started/index_e
n.htm (last visited Apr.15, 2009) (explaining how the European Commissioner for 
Information Society and Media launched a public debate on RFID at a 2006 technology 
conference). 
107 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) in Europe: Steps Toward a Policy Framework, at 3 COM 
(2007) 96 final (Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0096en01.pdf. 
108 Press Release, European Commission, A New Vision for the Internet, (Dec. 23, 2008), 
available at 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fetch?CALLER=FP7_NEWS&ACTION=D&RCN=30283. 
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deployed in a manner that respected the privacy rights of EU 
citizens.109  In this opinion, Hustinx noted the need for clearer 
guidance on how to apply the current legal framework to the RFID 
environment and for new EU legislation to regulate RFID use.110  In 
addition, Hustinx also argued that Article 3(3)(c) of the Radio and 
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Directive (which requires 
certain equipment classes or apparatus of particular types shall be so 
constructed that they incorporate safeguards to ensure that the 
personal data and privacy of the user and of the subscriber are 
protected) had not yet been used to require RFID technologies to 
provide data protection protections, but might support such a 
requirement.111  In addition, he argued for recognition of the “opt-in” 
principle for collection of personally identifiable information by 
means of RFID technology, and the identification of “Best Available 
Techniques” which would support the privacy-by-design principle.112  
However, a 2008 report issued by GRIFS on the “state of the art” of 
RFID standards noted, “There have been a number of proposals, 
particularly from an academic base, to introduce privacy enhancing 
technologies (“PETs”) to RFID technologies.  Few, almost none, of 
such PETs are so far present in the devices and air interface protocol 
standards.”113 
 Although EU efforts to harness RFID technology to serve 
economic goals while also complying with EU regulation may 
ultimately fail (just as OSI failed after the simpler TCP/IP protocol 
was introduced)114 such an outcome is far from certain.  These efforts 
 
 
 
 
109 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ‘Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
in Europe:  Steps Towards a Policy Framework’, 2008 O.J.  
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at 
http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consult
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111 See RFID in Europe:  Steps Towards a Policy Framework supra note 109, at ¶59 (citing 
Directive 1999/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Mar. 9, 1999, on 
radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition 
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214 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 5:2 
 
 
may instead contribute to outcomes perceived as positive in both 
LMEs and CMEs, meeting Putnam’s standard for winning both levels 
of two-level games.  The GRIFS survey of the “state of the art” of RFID 
technology was undertaken jointly by GRIFS, a special purpose policy 
research vehicle funded by the Commission on a temporary basis, 
ETSI, the European telecommunications standards agency, and GS1, 
the private consortia responsible for leading the development of many 
commercial RFID standards currently in use.115  Formal cooperation 
on global benchmarking efforts by ETSI, a de jure ESO, and GS1, a 
major global consortium that is not ANSI-accredited, and thus lacks 
de jure status under EU standards law and policy, is not 
unprecedented.  The ICT Standards Board was established in 1995 by 
CEN, CENELEC and ETSI to expand the scope of dialogue among de 
jure ESOs and de facto ICT SDOs.116 
 The EU Commission has suggested that moving from informal 
coordination among politically based de jure and market-based de 
facto international ICT SDOs to formal legal recognition should be 
based on the criteria developed by the WTO with reference to the Code 
of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards contained in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade.117  These principles have been restated in the 
following terms: 
A standard may be used in association with EU 
legislation and policies when the following attributes 
have been taken into account during the technical 
consensus-building phase as well as in the subsequent 
formal acceptance process:   
1. Openness:  Standards will be developed and 
maintained by a non-profit making organisation. 
Ongoing development will occur on the basis of an 
open decision making process accessible to all 
interested parties.  An open standardisation process 
 
 
 
 
115GRIFS, supra note 22, at 113. 
116 ICT Standards Boards, About, http://www.ictsb.org/About/ToR.htm (last visited May 
30, 2009). 
117 Patrick Van Eecke & Maarten Truyens, Standardisation in the European ICT Sector: 
Official Procedures at the Verge of Being Overhauled, SHIDLER J. L. COMM. & TECH. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
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will be driven by the relevant categories of stakeholders 
and reflect user requirements; 
2. Consensus:  The standard making process is a 
collaborative and consensus based activity.  The 
process will not favour any particular category of 
stakeholder; 
3. Balance:  The standardisation process should be 
accessible, at any stage of the development and 
decision making process, on a non-discriminatory basis 
to relevant stakeholders and the participation of all 
interested categories of stakeholders will be sought 
with a view to achieving balance; 
4. Transparency:  The process is accessible to all 
interested parties and all information concerning 
technical discussions and the decision making process 
is archived and identified.  Information on (new) 
standardisation activities is widely announced through 
suitable and accessible means.  Consideration and 
response will be given to comments by interested 
parties; 
5. Maintenance:  Ongoing support and maintenance over 
a long period is guaranteed; 
6. Availability:  Standards are publicly available for 
implementation and use at reasonable terms (including 
for reasonable fee or free of charge); 
7. Intellectual Property Rights:  IPRs essential to the 
implementation of standards will be licensed to 
applicants on a (fair) reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory basis (F)RAND, which may permit, 
at the discretion of the IPR holder, licensing essential 
IPR without compensation.  However, Royalty free 
(“RF”) IPR cannot be imposed by the Commission or a 
public procurement authority; 
8. Relevance:  The standard shall be effective and 
relevant: standards need to respond to market needs 
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and regulatory requirements, especially when these 
requirements are expressed in mandates; 
9. Neutrality and stability: Standards should whenever 
possible, be performance-oriented rather than based on 
design or descriptive characteristics.  They should not 
distort the (global) market, and should maintain the 
capacity for implementers to develop competition and 
innovation based upon them.  Additionally and in order 
to enhance their stability, standards should be based on 
advanced scientific and technological developments. 
10. Quality:  The quality and level of detail are sufficient to 
permit the development of a variety of competing 
implementations of interoperable products and 
services.  Standardised interfaces are not hidden or 
controlled by anyone other than the standards setting 
organisation.118 
The Commission has asked for feedback on the idea that reference 
might be made to de facto standards that comply with these principles 
in EU legislation.119  The possibility of EU funding for collaborative 
activities involving de facto and de jure ICT SDOs and the high profile 
given to RFID-related privacy and data security issues may also 
provide strong incentives for private consortia such as GS1 to focus on 
transparency, accountability and regulatory compliance as well as the 
short-term commercial objectives of consortia members.  
 To the extent that EU regulatory policies are more representative 
of regulatory policies in most other developed and developing 
economies than the more market-oriented policies characteristic of 
LMEs such as the U.S., then the EU may be able to create strong 
economic incentives for informal global ICT SDOs to comply 
voluntarily with WTO standard developing principles.  Because 
consortia lack de jure authority to engage in standard developing, they 
must continually struggle to justify their existence in terms of market 
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adoption of the standards they produce.  The proliferation in recent 
years of ICT consortia, and the absence of any regulatory framework 
other than antitrust law governing their activities in the U.S., 
contributes to wasteful competition among ICT SDOs.120  If EU 
regulators can articulate clear criteria for the recognition of standards 
developed by ICT consortia, then consortia may begin to compete for 
EU recognition as a way to distinguish themselves and their products 
in crowded global markets.  To the extent that consortia are able to 
combine responsiveness to market conditions with increased 
compliance with WTO standard developing principles, then the 
likelihood of “winner takes all” victories in global markets for ICT 
standards incompatible with CME regulatory goals would be reduced. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Under certain circumstances, ICT standards may regulate human 
behavior in a manner similar to that of more traditional legal 
institutions.  With the emergence of global ICT networks, the ICT 
standards that define the architecture of those networks have the 
potential to regulate behavior in many different countries 
simultaneously.  In recent decades, informal ICT SDOs with roots in 
the U.S. system of standards developing have dominated the process 
of developing and implementing ICT standards.  In the U.S., the 
legitimacy of the activities of SDOs, formal or informal, is generally 
perceived to be a function of resulting standards’ responsiveness to 
market conditions.  Outside the U.S., the nature of the formal legal 
mandate to an SDO is generally perceived as pivotal in assessing the 
legitimacy of its work.  In many areas, the work of informal ICT 
standards consortia and fora has eclipsed the work of more traditional 
international ICT standards organizations with clear formal de jure 
mandates from multilateral organizations or member countries.  
Technology companies with roots in the U.S. economy tend to 
dominate the work of ICT consortia, and often are rewarded well for 
their efforts in terms of market adoption of technologies they have 
developed or control.  It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the 
dominance in global markets of ICT standards produced by informal 
consortia is perceived in a positive light by most U.S. observers while 
it is regarded as a threat to politically legitimate standard-developing 
processes by many observers outside the U.S. 
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 Applying Putnam’s two-level game metaphor to the political 
economy of ICT standards development in national and international 
markets, ICT standards processes that are perceived as legitimate 
within CMEs and LMEs often differ significantly.  Under conditions of 
global trade liberalization, when strong network effects influence end 
user product choices, aggregation in global markets of individual end 
user choices may lead to widespread adoption of ICT standards that 
are incompatible with law and social values in CMEs.  In order for 
global ICT standards to be recognized as politically legitimate and to 
achieve widespread market adoptions in both LMEs and CMEs, some 
form of coordination between the two systems of standards 
developing is needed.  Given the practical difficulties of mandating 
greater transparency and accountability ex ante by ICT standards 
consortia, it may be more practical for CMEs to offer ex post 
recognition on a selective basis to leverage the interest of consortia in 
achieving the widest possible adoption of the standards they produce.  
By integrating both the market accountability of consortia and the 
political legitimacy of de jure ICT SDOs, it would be possible to win on 
both levels of the two-level game. 
 
